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CASE NOTES
GARNISHMENT-EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS-IN CONSTRUING "SUFFICIENT CAUSE"

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 329b(5),

GARNISHMENT

OF TEXAS RULE

THE REQUISITES FOR EQUITABLE

RELIEF IN A GARNISHMENT DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE (1) A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE, (2) LACK OF FAULT By GARNISHEE IN FAILING To
ANSWER, (3) AND FRAUD OR WRONGFUL ACT OF THE OTHER PARTY
IN PREVENTING GARNISHEE FROM DEFENDING THE ACTION. Texas

Machinery and Equipment Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil and Exploration Co., 442 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
Respondent corporation, in a proceeding in the nature of a bill of
review, sought relief from a default garnishment judgment taken by
petitioner corporation. In 1962 a money judgment of $11,080 was
taken by petitioners against the defendant in the main suit in which
respondent corporation was not a party. Unable to obtain satisfaction
of its judgment, petitioners brought an ancillary garnishment proceeding in 1967 against respondent who allegedly owed money to
the original defendant. Service was had upon the secretary-treasurer
of the respondent corporation who noted on his copy of the writ that
respondent did not owe the original defendant. President of respondent corporation was not informed of the writ until all other remedies
for relief were unavailable. Because respondent failed to answer the
garnishment writ, petitioners obtained a default judgment. Garnishee
was granted relief in the district court. On appeal the court of civil
appeals affirmed.' Held-Reversed. In construing "sufficient cause"
of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(5), 2 the requisites for equitable relief in a garnishment default judgment are (1) a meritorious
defense, (2) lack of fault by garnishee in failing to answer, (3) and

fraud or Wrongful act of the other party in preventing garnishee from
defending the action.
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding,3 its prime objectives
being to reverse a judgment after it has become final 4 and to prevent a
gross miscarriage of justice.5 The phrase "sufficient cause" has been
1Texas Machinery & Equipment Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil & Exploration Co., 434 S.W.2d
182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ granted).
2 TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b (5). "After the expiration of thirty (30) days from the date the
judgment is rendered or motion for new trial overruled, the judgment cannot be set aside
except by bill of review for sufficient cause ....
3 French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Sup. 1967); Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
Sup. 1964); American Spiritualist Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 366 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1963, no writ).
4 American Spiritualist Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 366 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963, no writ).
5 French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Sup. 1967); Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
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interpreted many times by the courts of Texas. The often cited default judgment case of Alexander v. Hagedorn clearly sets out the
qualifications for relief by bill of review. This case was neither the
first nor the last case to state that, in order for a default judgment to
be set aside by a bill of review, petitioner must allege and prove a
meritorious defense to the cause of action supporting the judgment,
that he was prevented from presenting by the fraud, accident or
wrongful act of the opposite party, unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own, and that he exercised due diligence in overturning
7
the cause.
Generally, all of these elements must be present for a bill of review
to be successful.8 An exception to this rule was the case of Hanks v.
Rosser9 in which, through the fault of a clerk of the court, the defendant failed to answer. The Texas Supreme Court set the default judgment aside holding that "the failure to answer was not intentional or
due to conscious indifference" and that the judgment creditor would
not be unduly inconvenienced.' 0 Thus a new criterion was substituted
in place of the requisite of proving extrinsic fraud of the opposite
party. Later cases seem to indicate that this qualification was a
peculiar incident and should not be considered as a modification of
the Hagedorn rule in all cases."
The relief sought by the bill of review in the instant case concerns
a garnishment proceeding. In Texas, garnishment is a purely statutory, 12 ancillary proceeding taking its jurisdiction from the main suit
and cannot be separated from the primary suit.' 3 Garnishment has
Sup. 1964); McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961); Perez v. Perez, 427
S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, no writ); Kelly Moore Paint Co. v. Northeast
National Bank of Fort Worth, 426 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1968, no writ).
6 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Sup. 1950).
7 Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Sup. 1950); see Hanks
v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31, 38-39 (dissent) for exhaustive listing of cases prior and subsequent
to the Hagedorn holding. Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Armstrong
v. Jacobs, 439 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Washington v. Golden
State Mutual Life Insurance Company, 436 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Brown & Root, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1968, no writ); Trinity River Authority of Texas v. McMurrey, 411 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Powell v. State of Texas, 410 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Woods v. Gamboa, 229 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8 Powell v. State of Texas, 410 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
9 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
10 Id. at 35.
11 Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.
Sup. 1966), dicta.
12 Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937); Snyder National Bank v. Pinkston,
219 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, no writ); Smith v. Houston Nat. Exch. Bank,
202 S.W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1918, no writ).
13 King & King v. Porter, 113 Tex. 198, 252 S.W. 1022 (Tex. Sup. 1923); Kelly v. Gibbs,
84 Tex. 143, 19 S.W. 563 (1892); TEX. R. Civ. P. 657 and following pertaining to ancillary
proceedings.
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been described as a mode of enforcing execution, 14 a process of attachment,' 5 and in the nature of a bill of discovery. 16 The original meaning
of the word "garnishment" comes from the French word "garnir",
meaning to warn or give notice.' 7 As an inquisitorial process, a garnishment writ seeks to ascertain "facts on which to base liability, if any,
of the garnishee, or to ascertain whether he has effects in his hands, or
knows of anyone who has effects belonging to the debtor which may
'8
be reached and subjected to the payment of the garnishor's debt.'
In Texas, the writ creates a lien from the date of levy,' 9 but the proceedings impound only those debts owing by the garnishee to the
20
defendants and those effects in the hands of the garnishee.
Being a harsh statutory remedy, garnishment will be construed
strictly and against the one resorting to the remedy.2 1 The purpose of
garnishment is to notify the garnishee that he must answer the questions propounded and to impound a debtor's assets and property.
Garnishment is used when writs of execution and attachment cannot
be used.2 2 The only issues that are to be determined in a garnishment
action are whether the garnishee is indebted to the defendant in the
main suit and to whom the garnishee shall pay the fund.23 Being
remedial in nature, garnishment pertains exclusively to the remedy
and not to the right. A Texas case held that since garnishment pertained only to remedies, the suing out of a writ to enforce collection
of a judgment was not equivalent to the institution of a suit to vin24
dicate a right.
After the court acquires jurisdiction over the garnishee by the writ,
'4

Kelly v. Gibbs, 84 Tex. 143, 19 S.W. 563 (1892); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Keith,

260 S.W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App-El Paso 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 273 S.W. 836.

15 United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 215, 75 S.Ct. 247, 99 L. Ed. 268.
16 Hanson v. Guardian Trust Co., 150 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ

dism'd jdgmt cor.).
17 Bugg v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 118 S.E. 56 (Ga. 1923).
18 McKesson & Robbins Inc. v. Southwestern Drug Corp., 165 S.W.2d 758, (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 141 Tex. 284, 172 S.W.2d 485.
19 United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 215, 75 S.Ct. 247, 99 L. Ed. 268.
20 First National Bank in Dallas v. Lampman, 442 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1969, no writ).
21 Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937); Kruger v. Sheffield, Garret & Carter,
341 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Daniels, 107 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, no writ); New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Keith, 273 S.W. 836 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt
adopted); Security State Bank & Trust Co. v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 250 S.W. 790
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ); Durfee Mineral Co. v. City Nat. Bank of
Temple, 236 S.W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
22 Hanson v. Guardian Trust Co., 150 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ

dism'd jdgmt cor.).
23 Smith v. Houston Nat. Exch. Bank, 202 S.W. 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1918, no writ).
24 First National Bank in Bronte v. Little, 6 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1928,
no writ).
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the proceedings are given a strict construction because the garnishee
is brought into the controversy between others when he is not charged
with having done a wrong to either party in the main sUit. 2 5 If a
garnishee answers a writ and that answer is contested by the plaintiff,
the garnishee then becomes a "party litigant." In a garnishment proceeding only one of the parties claims the fund; the other claims he
has the right to have the fund applied to the amount the defendant
26
owed him.
When the garnishee fails to answer, the authority to grant default
garnishment judgments is found in the rules relating to ancillary proceedings of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 When no answer is
given by the garnishee, a judgment is permitted for the amount of
indebtedness that the garnishor seeks to recover. 28 Freeman v. Miller,
an early garnishment case, held that "the law does not seek to impose
the payment of the debt due the principal debtor upon the garnishee
as a penalty for his failure to make full answer, but proceeds upon
the theory that, by not having made such answer, he tacitly admits
that he has the means in his own hands, or knows of property by
which such payment could be made." 29
In order to set aside a judgment by a bill of review, the companion
case to Freeman enunciated the rule that if by "accident or mistake or
other cause, injustice has been done the garnishee, he himself must
take the initiative, and by motion made in due time, or other proper
proceedings, seek to set aside the judgment. ' 30 Subsequently the same
garnishee brought a bill of review 3 ' to set aside the default judgment
that was taken against him without his knowledge and after he had
partially answered. In this later case the Texas court stated that the
garnishee must have a good defense and that the failure to answer must
not be due to garnishee's own neglect or omission. The garnishee must
show positively that it would be unjust and inequitable to permit the
judgment to be enforced. A mere showing that the garnishee did not
owe the defendant in the main suit is not enough.3 2 The "clearest
and strongest" reasons must be asserted for a court of equity to step
33
in and overturn a judgment.
25 Zimmerman v. First Nat. Bank of Bowie, 235 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26 May v. Donaldson, 141 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, no writ).
27 TEx. R. Civ. P. 667.
28 Kentucky Oil Corporation v. David, 285 S.W. 290 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt
adopted).
29 Freeman v. Miller, 53 Tex. 372 (1880).
30 Freeman v. Miller, 51 Tex. 443 (1879).
31 Freeman v. Miller, 53 Tex. 372 (1880).
32 Id.
33 Trammell v. Ullman, Lewis & Co., 96 S.W. 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
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An 1884 Texas case, Nevins v. McKee, 4 seems to agree with the
strict rules of Hagedorn by stating that fraud of the opposite party
must also be shown in order to obtain relief. The opinion in this case
was based on another default judgment case that was not a garnishment action. In Nevins, the garnishee was given actual notice of the
suit. Because of the attorney's error, the default was granted and was
not allowed to be set aside after adjournment. Another case has allowed
relief where the attorney was negligent but the garnishee was diligent
in asking the attorney to file his cause. 5 Following the Freeman reasoning, rather than Nevins, other cases state that the garnishee must
present a good defense and show an absence of negligence in failing to
prosecute by appeal or by writ of error. 6 In Kelly Moore Paint Co. v.
Northeast National Bank of Fort Worth,8 7 the president of garnishee
bank never saw the writ that was in the hands of an employee until
after the default judgment had become final. The court based its decision to allow relief by bill of review on the fact that the person
named in the citation was never served, but the court found that the
president was not negligent or was at most guilty of excusable neglect
in failing to answer. The court stated that it would be a manifest injustice to disallow relief because the bank as garnishee never owed the
money except by virtue of the default judgment taken against the
bank. The president also never received the statutory notice of default
that was enacted after the Hagedorn ruling. Commenting on the Kelly
Moore Paint case, Lowe and Archer state in their treatise 3 8 that for
bill of review relief "it is not essential to establish that the default was
brought about by wrongful conduct on the part of garnishor." 39
In the instant case the court in defining "sufficient cause" applied
the Hagedorn rule. Since the garnishee was unable to show that his
failure to answer was the fault of the garnishor, the court held that
he could not succeed in the bill of review. The court further held that,
since the corporation president did not file a motion for new trial
within the time allowed, he was also negligent. The majority found
that, since the instant cause was joined with the original writ under
the same number, the proceeding was an adversary one and therefore
the Hagedorn rule was applicable. The court stated that the garnishee
did not allege and prove that the failure to answer was unmixed with
34 61 Tex. 412 (1884).
First State Bank of Big Spring v. Wood, 242 S.W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922,
no writ).
36 McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961), a non-garnishment bill of
review; Murchison Oil Co. v. Hampton, 21 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929,
writ ref'd); Eagle Pharmacy v. Lamb, 265 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924).
37 426 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ).
38 TEXAS PRACTICE, Remedies, Lowe & Archer (1957), § 181, n.85.
85

39 Id.
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any fault or negligence of its own. The majority reasoned that there
was negligence for, although the president testified that he was not
notified of the writ or the judgment, another employee received the
service. Respondent in the instant case did allege fraud upon the court,
but the basis, the court pointed out, was a mistaken allegation that
the corporation was nonexistent, and therefore, no valid jurisdiction
existed. By applying the Hagedorn rule, the majority held that this
rule would now cover garnishment default cases because it covers any
action between adversaries and gives finality to judgments.
The dissent in the instant case spoke of the differences between a
garnishment action and a suit between adverse parties. A garnishee,
it stated, "is no more than a stakeholder," and no right or remedy of
the garnishor can be denied if there are no funds on which to base
liability. Justice Steakley (joined by Justice Reavley), dissenting, also
pointed out that the trial judge found that the person served with the
writ was a bookkeeper with no administrative authority over the affairs
of the company or those of the president. The trial judge also found
that the failure to answer was not the result of conscious indifference
and was unintentional. The failure to answer was due to mistake or
accident because the bookkeeper thought it unnecessary to take further
action when he realized that his employer did not owe anything to the
defendant in the main action and did not inform the president of the
issuance of the writ of garnishment against the company. The president also never received the statutory notice 40 of the default judgment
after it was taken.
The dissent in the instant case stated that Rosser 41 relaxed the
harshness of the Hagedorn rule and that this more lenient rule should
be followed in garnishment cases. Justice Steakley notes that this is
the first instance in Texas where the term "sufficient cause ' 42 has been
interpreted in garnishment default actions when a bill of review is the
only remedy left to the garnishee.
The minority reasoning seems to be more just and in the spirit of
the law that an equitable action seeks to protect. Because of the nature
of garnishment, the garnishee has suffered the consequences of a judgment to which he was not a party and in which he had no interest. The
majority view is that the garnishee is an adversary, and as such he is
subject to all the rules of ordinary adversary cases. Garnishment, as
pointed out, is not an ordinary case. In the New England states, the
garnishee is called a trustee, 41 and in Louisiana he is called a stake40 TEX. R. Civ. P. 239a.
41 Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d
42 TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(5).
43 Matthews v. Smith, 12 N.W.

31 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
821 (Neb. 1882).
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holder. 44 In Texas garnishment is not an independent action and
comes within the realm of ancillary proceedings. 45 The garnishee in
the instant case had no adverse interest in the suit to which he must
look for jurisdiction. He was merely a stranger to the main suit. The
Nevins case, although a garnishment case, is not applicable to the
instant case since that decision was based on a case that was an adversary proceeding and not a garnishment action. 48 The court mistakenly
assumed that garnishment is a true adversary proceeding.
The garnishee in the instant case did show that, since he did not
owe the money, he had a meritorious defense and that his failure to
answer was not due to a conscious indifference on his part. At most,
the failure of the employees to notify could be termed excusable neglect
under the circumstances. A case similar to the instant action allowed
relief stating that it would allow excusable neglect. 47 The court
seemed to be more lenient in allowing relief when the garnishee or
president of garnishee corporation was not given actual notice of the
impending garnishment action. It seems that this court should have
followed this reasoning.
One purpose for granting default judgments is to afford some finality
to judgments so that parties may know their respective rights and liabilities.4 8 In garnishment actions the rights were adjudicated in the
main case, and the garnishee enters the picture only where the remedy
is concerned. The harm to an innocent garnishee who owed nothing to
the garnishor, far outweighs the harm to the successful party in the
main action. The successful party still has his final judgment. He may
still obtain satisfaction of that judgment from another source. To
49
interpret "sufficient cause" for garnishment cases in light of Rosser
and similar cases by not imposing the necessity of showing fraud of
the opposite party, would not be changing a hard, fast rule in garnishment actions. There would still be the necessity of showing the strongest reasons for overturning the judgment. By allowing bill of review
relief in cases like the instant one, another main objective of preventing manifest injustice will be fulfilled. Certainly the fact that the garnishee must pay an $11,080 judgment that he did not owe and did
not know about because of excusable neglect should be enough reason
to allow relief.
The Federal courts have another solution to the problem of overturning default judgment cases where there is a showing of manifest
Newsom v. Savell, 90 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 1956).
45 TEx. R. Civ. P. 357 et seq.
46 Nevins v. McKee, 61 Tex. 412 (1884).
47 Kelly Moore Paint Co. v. Northeast National Bank of Fort Worth, 426 S.W.2d 591
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, no writ).
48 Crouch v. McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 (1940).
49 Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
44
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